

This exhibit has, by direction of the court, been filed separately with that part of the record which has been extracted and separately deposited with the Secretary of the Navy. This action was taken in the interest of the National security and the successful prosecution of the war.

H. PUGHWILL,
Captain USN, Judge Advocate.

(See Vol. IV of Exhibits for copy of Top Secret Exhibit 68.)

Exhibit No. 69A

[1]

SECRET

PEARL HARBOR, T. H., 1200, 30 November, 1941.

Memorandum for the Commander in Chief

Steps to Be Taken in Case of American-Japanese War within the Next Twenty-Four Hours.

1. Despatch to Pacific Fleet that hostilities have commenced.
2. Despatch to Task Force Commanders:
 - (a) WPL 46 effective.
 - (b) Sweeping plan cancelled.
 - (c) Comairbattor and units in company with him (Task Force 8) carry out present mission. Upon completion cover WAKE against enemy operations until joined by Task Force Three. Remainder of Task Force Two (now at sea in operating area) return to PEARL HARBOR.
 - (d) Raiding and Reconnaissance Plan effective, modified as follows: Cancel cruiser operations west of NANPO SHOTO; delay reconnaissance until Task Forces Two and Three are joined; Raider One join Task Force One; Task Force Three with units of Task Force Two present in PEARL HARBOR depart _____ and rendezvous with Comairbattor at Point "A" at _____; Commander Base Force send two tankers to Point "A" with utmost despatch, report expected time of their arrival.
 - (e) Send one Marine Bombing Squadron to MIDWAY.
- [2] 3. (a) I would not modify the movements of the WRIGHT, now enroute WAKE to MIDWAY, nor REGUITS, enroute PEARL to MIDWAY, nor ships bound to CHRISTMAS and CANTON.
- (b) I would continue WILLIAM WARD BUDROWS to WAKE, directing Comairbattor (ComTask Force 8) to have two destroyers join her as escort.
- (c) I would not withdraw any civilian workmen from outlying islands.
- (d) I would provide two destroyers to escort SARATOGA from longitude 150° west to PEARL HARBOR. (Under present set-up, Commander Task Force Three has been directed to furnish this escort from his force which would be at sea on arrival of SARATOGA. Under the plan of paragraph 2, above, this order should be transferred to Com Task Force One. This note added by Good).
- (e) I would not direct any change in passage of shipping to and from MANILA, nor would I send any added escorts, nor dispose any cruisers toward CALIFORNIA or SAMOA until further developments occur.

Exhibit No. 69B

[1]

SECRET

PEARL HARBOR, T. H., 1200, December 5, 1941.

Memorandum for the Commander in Chief

Recommended Steps to be taken in case of American-Japanese War within the next forty-eight hours.

1. Send despatch to Pacific Fleet that hostilities have commenced.
2. Send despatch to Task Force Commanders:
 - (a) WPL 46 effective. (Execute O-1A R5 except as indicated in (b) and (c) below. (The SS and VP plans will become effective without special reference to them).

(b) Commerce sweeping plan, including cruiser operations west of Nanpo Shoto, cancelled.

(c) Raiding and Reconnaissance Plan effective, modified as follows: Delay reconnaissance until Task Forces Two and Three are joined; Batdiv One join Task Force One; Commander Base Force send two tankers with utmost despatch to rendezvous with Task Force Three to eastward of Wake at rendezvous to be designated.

(d) Comairbafor and units in company with him (Task for 8) return to Pearl at high speed, fuel and depart with remainder of Taskfor Two, less BBs, to joint Task Force Three.

(e) LEXINGTON land Marine aircraft at Midway as planned (p.m. 7 Dec) and proceed with ships now in company (Taskfor 12) to vicinity of Wake.

(f) Comtaskfor Three proceed to Join LEXINGTON group. Return DMS to Pearl.

[2] 3. (a) Do not modify the movements of REGULUS at MIDWAY (departing 9th), nor ships bound to CHRISTMAS and CANTON.

(b) Direct that WILLIAM WARD BURROWS continue to WAKE but delay arrival until 10th. Direct that LEXINGTON group send two destroyers to join BURROWS prior to her arrival at WAKE.

(c) Do not withdraw any civilian workmen from outlying islands.

(d) Provide two destroyers to escort SARATOGA from longitude 150° west to PEARL HARBOR.

(e) Do not change passage of shipping to and from MANILA nor send any added escorts, nor dispose any cruisers toward CALIFORNIA or SAMOA until further developments occur.

(S) C. H. McMorris.

EXHIBIT No. 70

SECRET

UNITED STATES FLEET

U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship

CINC File No. A16/0129

PEARL HARBOR, T. H., January 23, 1941.

From: Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet.

To: The Chief of Naval Operations.

Subject: Chief of Naval Operations' Plan DOG.

References:

(a) Opnav secret despatch, 212155 of January, 1941.

(b) Opnav memorandum for Secnav Op-12-CTB of November 12, 1940.

1. Reference (a) was received by the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet, one day prior to the arrival of Commander McQueen at Pearl Harbor en route to the Navy Department. It is considered desirable to take advantage of his return to inform the Chief of Naval Operations of the views of the Commander-in-Chief as to the new situation.

2. In view of reference (a) and some degree of urgency implied therein, it is considered that study of the new situation and the preparation of plans therefor should take priority over the preparation of plans for Rainbow No. 3. Unless advice to the contrary is received, this will be done.

3. The new situation, as visualized by the Commander-in-Chief, alters the assumptions and concepts of Rainbow No. 3, principally in that the major offensive effort of the United States is to be exerted in the Atlantic, rather than in the Pacific, and in that a "waiting attitude" will be taken in the Pacific, pending a determination of Japan's intentions. If Japan enters the war or commits an overt act against United States' interests or territory, our attitude in the Pacific will be primarily defensive, but opportunities will be seized to damage Japan as situations present themselves or can be created.

4. Under the foregoing general conception, it is deemed desirable to outline as briefly as possible, certain tentative assumptions, upon which the actions of the U. S. Fleet in the Pacific will be predicated. These are:

(a) The United States is at war with Germany and Italy.

(b) War with Japan is imminent.

(c) Units of the Pacific Fleet may be detached to the Atlantic on short notice. The numbers and types of these units are at present unknown.